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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF AMERICA, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN FURNITURE COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and AppeJ/ant. 




F. ROBERT BAYLE, 
-------------------·--.. ---·---· 
---ci;;k",-Supreme Court, Utah Attorney for Plaintiff 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GENERAL INSURANCE CO!\-IPANY 
OF AMERICA, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHRISTIANSEN FURNITURE COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appella;:t. 
Case No. 7459 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Respondent, the General Insurance Company of America, 
hereinafter referred to as "Insurance Company," sued· Appel-
lant; the Christiansen Furniture Company, a Utah Corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as "Furniture Company," for rent which 
accrued during the two months period imme4iately following 
a fire on May 2, 1946, which partially damaged the property 
it was occupying as tenant. 
The respondent cannot agree with the statement of facts 
contained in appellant's brief insofar as the same states that 
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after the fire occurred, the owner of the premises requested 
the Furniture Company to hold everything in the premises so 
as to help in protecting the property until fire adjustment 
insurance claims could be handled; nor that the building was 
destroyed by the fire; nor that the appellant vacated the 
. premises and only· instructed the Furniture Company to keep 
a watch at night, and that there was an agreement that there 
would be. no rent during the period in question. . 
The· Furniture Company ·occupied the premises at 66 
South· Main Street in Salt Lake City, under an oral month-to-
month agreement prior to the fire, which occurred in the early 
morning hours on lvlay 2, 1946 (Tr. 42, 43 and 44). The 
building was owned by the Rental Investment Company, a 
Utah Co_rporation, and rental. paid by the Furniture Company 
was $875.00 per month (Tr. 43, 65, 66, 73, 75, 76 and 82-
Ph:tint-iff' s _Exhibit A) . 
The· Rental Investment Company and the Furniture Com-
pany were separate Corporations but were kindred in nature 
as the officers oL both companies were virtually the same. 
Howard A. Christiansen was President of both cqrporations, 
. Mabel C.-Larsen was Secretary-Treasurer of both companies, 
while Ralph H. Christiansen was Vice President of the Rental 
Investment Company and Golden M. Christiansen was Vice 
_President of .the Furniture Company. _Thus t_he control of the 
.two corporations was in the Christiansen family (Tr. 43, 53 
and 74). 
The premises ·were not rendered wholly unfit for occu-
. -pancy as is claimed by the Furniture Company. ·.The actual 
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fire was confined to the area of the store where the business 
office had been previously situated, and there was not very 
extensive damage to the interior, except for smoke (Tr. 61, 
62, 70 and 98, Plaintiff's Exhibits D, F, G, J and I). 
The Furniture Company continued to occupy the premises 
during the months of May and June. The office was maintained 
therein and customers were invited in to make payments on 
accounts and contracts (Tr. 66, 68, 80, 8l, 89, 96 and 97-
Plaintiff's Exhibits D and E). A two-day fire sale was con-
ducted on June 24 and 25, some seven weeks after -the fir~ 
(Tr. 44, 69, 82, 83, 84, 86, 89, 90, 91 and 93-Plaintiff's Ex-
hibits B and K). The Furniture_ Company finally__ va(:~ted 
the premises on July 2nd or 3rd (Tr. ?9). 
The Insurance Company paid the Rental Investme~! CotJ:l-
pany for the loss of rent sustained, as a result of the fire clamage 
to the building, under the provisions of an "insurance policy 
which insured the rental income from the premises_ r~ulting 
from fire (Plaintiff's Exhibits A and C) . 
Had the Furniture Company promptly vacated the premises 
directly following the fire, repairs could have been completed 
within sixty to seventy days (Tr. 75 and 76). The Insurance 
Company was only obligated to pay for- the time it would 
require to repair the building (Tr. 78). However, the- Furni-
ture Cotnpa~y did nothing to facilitate ·vacating the-_ premises 
(Tr. 74). --- - -
At the time of settlement, the Insurance Company tt'ok 
-a subrogation agreement from the Rental Investrilent Company 
-(Tr; 74~Plaintiff's Exhibit A). -
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The Insurance Company then brought suit under this 
subrogation agreement for the rent covering the ·months of 
May and June, during which time the Furniture Company was 
in possession of, and using the premises. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Trial Court propedy denied Defendant's motion 
for non-suit and dismissal at the conclusion of Plaintiffs 
evidence. 
4. The Trial Court did not err in its findings that the 
rental was $875.00 per month and in awarding Plaintiff judg-
ment against the Defendant for two months rent plus interest. 
3. The findings of fact of the Trial Court upon conflicting 
evidence should riot be disturbed on review. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFEND-
ANT:S MOTIONFOR NON-SUIT AND DISMISSAL AT 
THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S EViDENCE. 
In support of the motion for non~suit, the· appellant con-
. terids "that there was· an agreement that there should ·be rio 
rent paid by the Furniture Company to the landlord, The Rental 
Investment Company, . for · the two months' occupany of the 
premises follriwing the ~fire. Howard -Chiistiarisen, President 
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and Manager of the Furniture Company, testified that the 
Rental Investment Company as landlord requested the Furni-
ture Company to continue occupancy of the premises after the 
fire as "a watchdog" and that it was not considered as a tenant. 
1-.luch confusion can be avoided in this case if it will be 
kept in mind that Howard Christiansen was President of both 
the Rental Investment Company, the landlord, and the ap-
pellant Furniture Company, the tenant. Hence any agreements 
alleged to have been consummated after the fire regarding the 
matter of rent to be paid would be merely a state of mmd 
existing within the person of Howard Christiansen, an agree-
ment conveniently made with himself. Had this been the 
usual landlord-tenant situation, where the two corporate en-
tities were unrelated insofar as their officers were ·concerned, 
the tenant would have been o~liged to immediately vacate 
the premises or in lieu thereof, stand liable for the rent. The 
contents of the building in the form of furniture stock would 
not have been the concern of the landlord had not the President 
been one and the same for both Corporations. 
Counsel for the appellant details at length the testimony 
of Howard Christiansen in support of his contention of non-
suit. However, the testimony of the most important witness, 
Scott Wetzel, Jr., has been entirely ignored._ He testifted that 
he was an independent insurance adjuster employed by ·the 
Insurance Company to i_nvestigate . the f;ire _ and . -handle the 
adjustment of the rental loss~ with the Rental Investment 
Company_ (Tr. 60 and- ~1 ). His_ investig~tion-b.egan th~- qay 
of the fire -(Tf. 61) _-and c9ntinued t~roughout- the two-month 
: pe#od ~9£ -:oqcup~ncy o~ . the_ prem_i~es :bY the- ~~rni~re -C~m-
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pany, and for several months- thereafter until settlement· was 
finally concluded (Tr. 74). Witness Wetzel had photographs 
taken (Plaintiffs Exhibits D through I) on May 29th when 
it became apparent that Howard Christensen was intentionally 
delaying in an effort to effect a more favorable settlement with 
the other _insurance carriers on the damages to the- building. 
An entire alteration of the store from the original architectural 
: design was contemplated and vacating by the Furniture Com-
pany was accordingly delayed (Tr. 64). During this course 
of events the Furniture Company continued to occupy the 
premises, conducted a fire sale on June 24th and 25th, and 
not until July 2nd or 3rd were the premises finally vacated. 
The evidence is uncontradicted in this respect and the photo-
graphs (Plaintiff's Exhibits D to I) conclusively show that 
the damage to the building was not extensive and that most of 
the furniture was undamaged except for smoke (Tr. 66 ancl 
67; 
.The ag!eed rental of the premises was $875.60 per month 
(Tr. 65 and 66-Plaintiff's Exhibit A).- The Furniture Com-
pany retained possession for its exclusive use and benefit dur-
ing the two-month period following the fire and accordingly 
incurred liability for the rent. The Insurance Company de-
sired to settle the claim for loss of rental with the Rental 
Investment Company upon a fair basis but when the Furniture 
-Company}nten!io~ally delayed vacating the'premises for over 
two months after the fire, it insisted upon an -agreement of 
__ s:ubi9gati9ti- perm~tt!ng-"it _to seek restitution for the period 
-~ o{ time-the_ F-urniture-C:ompany occupied_ the building as a 
:- tenant. (Tt. 65f - The- subrogation agreement contained a 
- 8 
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covenant whereby the Rental Investment Company warranted 
that it had not released or discharged the Furniture Company 
from any claim it may have had for rent during the occupancy 
of the premises following the fire (Plaintiff's Exhibit A). 
The Court's attention is invited toa portion of the testi-
mony of witness Wetzel (Tr. 73 and 74) which aptly explains 
the difficulties in concluding settlement in view of the collu-
sion existing between the Furniture Compa-ny as tenant,· and 
the Rental Investment Company, as landlord: 
By Mr. Skeen. "You know of no agreement of any 
kind with respect to rental as between the Rental In-
vestment and the Christiansen Furniture Company after 
the date of the fire on May 2 ?-
A. I know of no agreement. 
Q. And in your testimony here and in the claim that 
is made you were simply assuming that· the same 
rental would carry on after the fire as before the 
fire? 
A. Well, as you should remember, there was cohten-
tention by me that the loss of rental· to the RPntal 
Investment Company was a difficult ·thing for, me 
to determine, for the reason _that as l. dealt .with 
you, y~u were the attorney· for the _R.ental trivestment 
as against the attorney for the Christiansen Furni-
ture Company, for whom you were ·also the attor-
ney; so I was actually dealing with .two _merged 
corporations who were actually one :and the_ ~arne 
. _ . ~the. sarne officers, practically _every or1e: · · 
' . ~- . ~ . . ., . 
It was hard for. me to determine wh~f th,~ o\Jliga-
-tion was to the tenant arrd back "to the landlord. 
-_ I C:ontend·ed {roill the b~giririing that aftet:the -in-
.- v.entor:ie·~ had :b~_en. completed an:d th~ -inSIJ.ff!~Ce 
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companies had ·all agr~ed with. the- Christiansen 
Furniture Company as to the extent of the damage, 
the insurance company which had the Rental In-
vestment was prejudiced by the • fact that the 
Christiansen Furniture Company remained in the 
premises and did nothing else to facilitate the date 
that they _could return to the premises. 
Q. That was the basis of the controversy between the 
Christiansen Furniture Company and the insurance 
company which finally resulted in the $4,000 set-
tlement? 
A. The $4,000 settlement was made on demand from 
you, and any excess of that amount of money, the 
agreement· was to reduce it in round figures, and 
I passed it on to my principals, and they authorized 
me to settle with this subrogation agreement. 
The Trial Court had all of the evidence before it at the 
conclusion of the plaintiff's case. It was the trier of the facts 
and had opportunity to observe the demeanor of the various 
w~tnesses. The Cop.rt concluded that the plaintiff had sustained 
its burden of proof in showing a legal obligation on the part 
of the Furniture Company to pay rent for the two-month period 
follo~ing the fire and I respectfully submit that the defendant's 
motion -for non-suit ·and dismissal was properly denied. 
-II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FIND-
INGS THAT THE RENTAL· WAS $875.00 PER MONTH 
AND IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT 
.AGAINST THE DEFENDANT . FOR TWO MONTHS 
RENt PLUS tNTEREST. 
1_0 
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The only question of law really involved in the instant case 
is whether the Furniture Company is liable for the full amount 
of rent as a result of having retained possession of the premises 
for a two-month period after the saine were partially damaged 
by the fire. The evidence amply shows that the Furniture 
Company did make substantial use of the premises and that 
the same were not vacated until July 2nd or 3rd, two full 
months after the fire. 
The law is clearly stated in 32 American Jurisprudence, 
Section 493, page 402: 
"According to the common law as declared by the 
English courts and by a rna jority <?f . the American 
courts, a tenant remains liable for. the agreed rent of 
the demised premises so long· as any_ part there()£ re-
mains in existence capable of being· occupied or enjoyed 
by him, irrespective of in jury or destruction by· fire 
or other casualty. Thus, in the -absence ofa provision 
in the lease, or of a statue, to the contrary,. the destn1:c:~ 
tion of buildings upon the leased· premises during the 
term by fire, inevitable accident, the violence of nature, 
or a public enemy, not so complete as to leave no part of 
the subject matter of the lease in existence, does not 
relieve the tenant from the obligation of his covenant 
to pay rent; or entitle him to an abatement of a pro-
portional part of the rent." 
36 C.J., Section 1130, page 325. 
52 .C. J. S., Section 486, page 255. 
This is- clearly the majority rule -and is followed in the 
recent case -of: 
-Anderson· vs. Ferguson _(~~sbj!lgton~1~4~) _l3_5 
P. 2d 302. 
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wherein the Court adjudged the tenant liable for the payment 
of rent where a portion of the premises were destroyed by fire. 
Another case quite in point is Knoblaugh et al vs. Mc-
Kinney et al, Cal. 1935, 42 P. 2d 332. 
In this case an earthquake rendered ·the plaintiff's apart-
ment building uninhabitable for the most part, but the defend-
ant, as a tenant, elected to remain in possession while the 
plaintiff made repairs. The Trial Court held that the defendant 
was liable for the full amount of the rent which was not affected 
by the impairment of the property. by the earthquake. 
Likewise in the case of White vs. Steele (Texas, 1930) 
33 S.W. 2d 224, the Court held the tenant liable for rent during 
the period of occupancy following a fire which partially destroy-
. ed th~ premises. In that case the defendant was renting a 
store room in _a hotel _building when the building was about 
50 per cent destroyed by fire: The defendant continued to use 
a part of the space and thereby became liable for the full 
amount of· the rent. 
Gamble~Robinson Company vs. Buzzard et al. 65 Fed. 
2d 950. 
Demund vs. Oro Consolidated Mines (Arizona) 108 
P. 2d 770. 
Nick Pedro vs. D. A. Potter et al, 242 P.926, 
. 42 A. L. R. 1165. 
in the ca~e-ofSchatbauer vs. Cobean et al (N. M. 1938) 
· 80 Pac. 2d 7S5, llS A. L. R. 1_02, the tenant occupied a store 
· · buildirtg when the-· san?e ·was partially· damaged by ·fire: - The 
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The rule is also stated in Underhill, Landlord and Tenant, 
Vol. II, paragraph 788, page 1339, wherein the author says: 
"The relation of landlord and tenant is not ·deter-
mined by the destruction of the premises either where 
the lease is _for a term of years in writing or from year 
to year. · It is a well settled· rule of the common law 
that where lands are the subject of a demise and the 
buildings and improvements thereon are accidentally 
destroyed before the end of the term, this destruction 
of the buildings by fire, tempest or flood does not dis-
charge the covenant to -pay rent in the absence of an 
express stipulation to that effect." 
See also Tiffany-Real Property, Third Edition, 
Volume 3, para. 905, page 567. 
Applying the foregoing rule of law to the instant· case, 
the trial court properly found that the Furniture Company w~s 
liable for rent for the two months in question and entered 
judgment accordingly. 
I fail to see where the two. cases cited in_ appellant's brief 
are applicable to the instant situation. Thes~ cases bo~h 
involved bankruptcy matters wherein a receiver was appoint~d _ 
to 1 iquidate the assets of the businesses. The premises were 
occupied for storage purpos~s in connection with preserving 
the property of each receivership. . There was no claim that 
the relationship of landlord and tenant eXisted and· accordingly 
under the changed conditions the receiver in each ins~ance was 
liable only for fair and reasonable rental based 'upon the 
limited use of the premises. The respondent :has no argum~nt 
with the conclusion reached by the Court in the two afore-
mentioned cases for the reason that in each of_ them_ -a: r~~e!y_~r 
'13 
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had replaced the tenant and hence the landlord-tenant relation-
ship was terminated. However; the cases have no application 
to the instant situation. 
I respectfully submit that the Trial Court did not ~~r 
in- its ·Findings and--that the judgment as ·entered should be 
affirmed. 
III 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIA:L COURT 
UPON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE 
DISTURBED ON REVIEW. 
This---was~ a law action, and the Court made its findings 
of facf oasea· on· evidence upon which there was little conflict, 
except f.or tl1e biased testimony of witness Howard A. Christ-
iansen~ 
In such a case, the authorities are in accord to the effect 
that, in a law_ case, findings of a Trial Court will not be dis-
turbed, unless ·~i~·~iiy· ·against the weight of the evidence. 
~-- ·:..,_- ' -- ;.__ . ..:.....·-.:.. -- ;.: .. -- -
_)2 :c;_ j:· s:, Para: 566, page 407: 
~'·}~-~-"~1,1~-f~.~~~~)q~.'!e~t, questi?ns. of law are for the 
determination· of fne·-court, while 1ssues of fact are to 
be determined by. the jury or by the trial court sitting 
without a jury." 
. 3 Am. Jur. 470: 
·'The weight of conflicting evidence in an action tried 
by the court without a jury is exclusively for the trial 
court; and the appellate court must accept as true that 
t4 
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which tends to sustain the decision, and reject any 
testimony in conflict with it." 
The foregoing rule has been recently confirmed, by this 
Court. 
See Waverly Oil Works Co. vs. R. B. Epperson, Inc., 
105 Utah 553, 144 P. 2d 286. 
As has been heretofore discussed at length under Points 
I and II, the trial court had substantial evidence to prove the 
questions of duration of the tenancy by the Furniture Company, 
a~d the time of termination thereof. The findings were in 
favor of the plaintiff on these issues and judgment accordingly 
entered. From a preponderance of the ~vidence, the Court 
properly drew its own conclusion as to the liability· of the 
appellant Furniture Company for the payment of rent during 
the two-month occupancy of the premises foJlowing the fire .. 
ln conclusion, I respectfully submit that the judginerit 
as rendered by the trial court is, in all respects, correcF'antl 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. ROBERT BAYLE, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and 'Respondent. 
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